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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 14-1547 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LARON CARTER, 
                        Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-12-cr-00071-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 November 18, 2014 
 
BEFORE:  RENDELL, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: November 19, 2014) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Laron Carter was found guilty by a jury of aiding and abetting a bank 
robbery by acting as the getaway driver.  At trial, Carter asked the District Court to add a 
jury instruction on “accessory after the fact.”  The District Court denied Carter’s 
requested instruction.  The District Court charged the jury with the Third Circuit Model 
Jury Instruction for aiding and abetting, but modified the charge by instructing that the 
jury “must find that the [G]overnment proved beyond a reasonable doubt  . . . that the 
defendant knowingly did some act, to wit, driving the car, for purpose of aiding [and 
abetting].”  We review a challenge to a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion and 
finding none here, will affirm Carter’s conviction.1 
 Carter argues on appeal that the jury should have received a specific instruction on 
unanimity because the Government promoted several different theories of criminal 
liability in an attempt to convict him of aiding and abetting the robbery.  Carter relies on 
our decision in United States v. Beros, 833 F.3d 455 (3d Cir. 1987), to support his 
argument.  In Beros, we determined that the general unanimity instruction was inadequate 
where a defendant had been charged in the indictment with numerous acts, each of which 
could constitute a violation of the relevant statute.  Id. at 461.  We were concerned in 
Beros that the jurors could have agreed that the defendant violated the statute, but 
predicated their conclusions on different acts.  Id.  We held, therefore, that the jurors 
should have been instructed that they must unanimously agree as to which specific act or 
acts supports the defendant’s guilt.  Id. at 461-62.   
                                              
1 Carter does not appeal his sentence. 
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 Carter’s reliance on Beros, however, is misplaced.  First of all, a specific 
unanimity instruction (e.g., telling jurors that they need to be unanimous about the way in 
which an offense was committed) is necessary only when “the jury is likely to be 
confused as to whether it is required to be unanimous on an essential element.”  United 
States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1991).  In the “routine case” a “general 
unanimity instruction will ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a 
conviction, even where an indictment alleges numerous factual bases for criminal 
liability.”  Id. (quoting Beros, 833 F.2d at 460).  Carter was charged solely with aiding 
and abetting a bank robbery.  The indictment never alleged that he engaged in separate or 
overlapping offenses.2  Therefore, we see no risk that jurors in Carter’s case would have 
been confused by the District Court’s instruction.   
 Further, even were we to assume a Beros-type instruction was required because 
the Government presented multiple charges and/or theories of criminal liability, the 
District Court’s instructions cured any such problem.  Pursuant to the modified 
instruction, supra, jurors had to unanimously agree that Carter acted as the getaway 
driver during the bank robbery.  Clearly, any reasonable juror would have known that the 
sole basis for his or her verdict was whether Carter drove the getaway car and the District 
Court’s instruction cleared away any possible confusion for jurors.   
                                              
2 Count One of the Indictment alleged that “On or about May 10, 2012, in the State and 
District of Delaware, TYRONE WILLIAMS and LARON CARTER, defendants herein, 
by intimidation, did take from the person and presence of various bank employees, a sum 
of money, belonging to and in the care, custody, control, management, and possession of 
the Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2011 Concord Pike, Wilmington, Delaware, the deposits of 
which were then insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in violation of 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(a) and Section 2.” 
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 In sum, and having considered all arguments raised by the Appellant, we find no 
merit to them and will affirm conviction.   
 
 
